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The road to nowhere?
Prospects for a  
post-Brexit trade deal
The Brexit negotiations continue towards an inevitable 
showdown, most probably at the EU Summit in 
December 2018. Faced with a choice between the 
Withdrawal Agreement (WA) and a ‘no-deal’ scenario, 
the United Kingdom will – most likely – choose not 
to commit economic suicide. The transition period, 
which will be included in the WA, will buy some time 
to negotiate the post-Brexit relationship. However, the 
next phase of negotiations will not be any easier: the 
UK and the EU will find it virtually impossible to agree 
on a trade deal. As a consequence, at the end of the 
transition period, the cliff edge will loom again. But 
there is an alternative – not to leave the Single Market 
and Customs Union after all.
BACKGROUND – WHAT LONG-TERM 
FUTURE RELATIONSHIP?
A deep and special relationship?
Ever since the UK voted to leave the EU on 23 June 
2016, the question what the long-term economic 
relationship between the UK and the EU will look like 
has been on everybody’s mind. But progress has been 
slow. The EU has insisted on sequencing – determining 
the exit modalities before the discussion on the 
future relationship – and has made it clear that the 
UK cannot have its cake and eat it too, i.e. having 
the benefits of membership while leaving the Union. 
Although the UK had stated that it aimed for a “deep 
and special relationship”, any tentative proposal from 
London has been (and will continue to be) challenged 
by an opposite faction of the Conservative Party. The 
latest ideas put forward in the so-called ‘Chequers 
proposition’ appear to break EU red lines such as the 
indivisibility of the Single Market and are thus very 
unlikely to materialise.
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At the same time, London has set two crucial red 
lines: first, the UK will exit both the Customs Union 
(CU) and Single Market (SM). Second, EU regulations 
and jurisdictions will cease to apply. While in the past 
few months there has been an intensive domestic 
debate on how the UK can stay as close as possible to 
the CU, so far these UK red lines have not changed. 
From an EU perspective, this implies that the future 
relationship will have to be defined by a trade deal, 
similar to the bilateral agreements concluded with 
Japan or Canada. Economically, such trade deals are 
significantly inferior to membership of the Single 
Market, as they are more limited in scope – broadly 
excluding services – with integrated markets not 
being the default. 
A frictionless border with Northern Ireland?
An exit from the CU and the SM also creates significant 
dilemmas regarding the border between the Republic 
of Ireland and Northern Ireland. Both the EU and the 
UK have committed to keeping this border frictionless 
without physical infrastructure. But so far the UK 
has failed to come up with a viable solution that is 
compatible with its red lines. The so-called backstop, 
which the EU insists on including in the WA, would see 
Northern Ireland effectively remaining in the CU and 
SM – implying a customs border in the Irish Sea – if the 
UK cannot come up with an alternative solution that 
guarantees a frictionless border.
Many in the UK see this outcome as politically 
unacceptable. For this reason, the UK Government has 
been looking into possible customs arrangements for 
the UK as a whole, as well as regulatory alignment. 
The partial proposals have so far failed to convince 
the EU27, in part because they involve agreeing on and 
creating new and untested governance arrangements. 
Thus, unless the UK changes its red lines, the 
negotiations will focus on a free trade agreement. 
In any case, the talks on the details of the future 
relationship have to start after Brexit since Brussels 
can only engage in trade discussions with third 
countries. The only reference to the future relationship 
will be in the political declaration, which is merely a 
statement of intent.
STATE OF PLAY – THE REMAINING HURDLES
To get to the negotiations on the future relationship, 
the UK will have to accept the WA, including the 
backstop. Post-Brexit, it foresees a transition - or 
standstill – period until the end of 2020, in which 
all the provisions of the Customs Union and the 
Single Market will continue to apply, but the UK 
will no longer have political representation in the 
Union’s institutions. Any agreement on the long-term 
relationship will have to be concluded before the end 
of the transition period, although there might be the 
possibility of a limited extension (one year or so) if it is 
built into the WA. However, even then, there would be 
little time to negotiate a trade deal.
There is still the possibility that the process will be 
altered or stopped by Westminster. There is currently 
no majority for a hard Brexit. But time is running 
out. Prime Minister May will probably be able to 
force through the WA when the UK faces the choice 
between that agreement or no deal at all, which would 
be economically and politically disastrous for the 
UK. Theresa May will need to rely on the votes of the 
Conservative Party, which means that she will probably 
not offer a soft Brexit given the strength of the 
Eurosceptic wing within her party. But even if the UK 
moves closer to a soft Brexit, the only place to include 
an aspiration for a closer relationship would be in the 
political declaration. The EU27 might well be willing 
to accommodate such a change in political direction as 
long as it does not imply a weakening of EU principles, 
such as the indivisibility of the Single Market. It will 
then be up to the negotiations on the long-term 
relations to deliver. They will, however, be much harder 
than most commentators seem to expect.
PROSPECTS – TOWARDS THE CLIFF EDGE 
ONCE AGAIN
Beyond Brexit: getting more, not less complicated
If the WA is agreed, the post Brexit transition period 
will be the time in which to negotiate the long-term 
relationship, starting from the aspirations set out in 
the political declaration that accompanies the WA. For 
many, this will be a relief, expecting that negotiations 
will advance more quickly once the Article 50 issues 
are out of the way. But this is unlikely to be the case. 
Presciently, in October last year, Angela Merkel noted 
that “the second stage […] is undeniably going to be 
more complicated than the first stage”.1
 
The process will start by setting the final goal of the 
negotiations, i.e. the landing zone that is crucial 
in defining the negotiation process. It is easy for 
both sides to agree that there should be a deep and 
comprehensive trade deal, together with a customs 
partnership. But this does not imply that the 
negotiations will produce a Norway+ agreement. As 
long as the UK red lines (leaving the CU and the SM) 
and those of the EU27 (the benefits of the SM and the 
CU can only be granted to countries fully committed 
to both and respecting all obligations such as Freedom 
of Movement) the most integrated solution the 
negotiations can reach is a Canada+ arrangement. In 
other words, the only workable solution appears to be 
an ambitious and far-reaching free trade agreement. 
But even if it is the best and most comprehensive trade 
deal the EU has ever struck, it is still a long way short 
of being inside the Single Market. And it is far from 
certain that both sides can agree on such a trade deal.
Agreeing on a disintegration deal
One of the critical challenges is time. Negotiating a 
comprehensive and ambitious agreement will take 
longer than the 21 months of the transition period.2 
Even an extension of the transition by a year or so 
will probably not be enough, especially since the 
beginning is likely to be slow: in 2019, the upcoming 
changes at the helm of EU institutions (Parliament, 
Commission, and Council) are expected to delay 
substantive progress.
But time is not the only problem. There are other 
reasons why concluding a free trade agreement will 
be challenging:
1. First, on the EU side, the negotiations will become 
more technical,  driven by different negotiation teams 
for each topic (e.g. trade, security, justice and home 
affairs). The experienced EU negotiators will be subject 
to much less political pressure to compromise. They 
will also benefit from a much stronger mandate to 
deliver on the specific objectives of each member 
state, which will amount to a long wish list containing 
many politically tricky issues for the UK, including for 
example Gibraltar or fisheries. Conversely, there will 
be vested interests in the EU that will put pressure on 
the negotiations to broadly exclude certain sectors, for 
example, Financial Services. Furthermore, the EU may 
impose constraints on the UK’s ability to set its own 
policies post-Brexit as the EU could see the latter as 
threatening the level playing field, i.e. fair and open 
competition post-Brexit.
2. Second, the scope of the negotiations will be much 
broader given the breadth and width of the existing 
UK-EU relationship. Tactical exclusion of certain sectors 
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1  https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/oct/20/brexit-trade-talks-
more-complicated-than-first-phase-angela-merkel
2  For example, CETA, the Canada-EU deal, took seven years to negotiate.
or issues, usually a vital tool in trade, is not possible. 
Moreover, there are many cross-cutting issues, such as 
data transfers or currently joint regulatory institutions, 
which will play a significant role given the intricacy of 
the UK-EU relationship. It also extends to level playing 
field provisions, where the EU is likely to demand more 
from the UK than from other trading partners.
3. Third, there is also a big world out there. Any 
privileged and integrated relationship between the EU 
and the UK will have repercussions on their respective 
trading with third parties. In a nutshell, under the 
WTO’s Most Favoured Nations provisions, special 
privileges afforded to one country must be provided 
to all trading partners that have comprehensive trade 
agreements with the EU or the UK. Besides, maintaining 
access to EU markets will impose limitations on the UK’s 
trade deals with other third countries.
Most fundamentally, there are no gains 
from trade to be made compared to the 
current status quo. Leaving the Single 
Market will entail costs across all 
sectors. It is a trade deal inferior to any 
other: no gains from further opening of 
markets but costs of disintegrating the 
existing relationship.
Finally, and most fundamentally, there are no gains 
from trade to be made compared to the current status 
quo. Leaving the Single Market will entail costs across 
all sectors. It is a trade deal inferior to any other: no 
gains from further opening of markets but costs of 
disintegrating the existing relationship. Even if the 
Brexiteers might claim that there is the political gain of 
reclaiming control, this will be near impossible to sell 
politically in the UK.
Any deal will have to be ratified by both sides. If it is 
a comprehensive trade deal, i.e. a mixed agreement, it 
will entail a complicated EU ratification process, with 
a requirement for unanimity even down to regional 
parliaments in some countries (e.g. Belgium). Any UK 
government will struggle to convince Westminster that 
such a trade deal is the only option on the table. For 
many, especially on the soft Brexit side, it will look like 
a terrible deal when compared to the status quo. But the 
Brexiteers are also likely to baulk at such a one-sided 
agreement. And for Northern Ireland, it could well 
imply the backstop coming into force.
Between a rock and a hard place
This dilemma puts significant pressure on the UK, 
with a post-transition default outcome of ‘no trade 
deal’ with all the asymmetric costs this implies. Even 
if failing to sign a trade pact at the end of transition 
is not as disastrous as leaving without a WA now (as 
more contingencies can be put into place), for the UK, 
the economic costs would still be enormous. On the EU 
side, costs would be much lower. While there would be 
economic interests pushing for a deal on the long-term 
relationship, for any of the EU27, there might also be 
a countervailing incentive to torpedo the whole deal if 
their interests are not delivered. Disunity among the 
27, which arguably would have helped the UK in the 
Article 50 negotiations, thus becomes an impediment 
for reaching a deal.
No trade deal at the end of transition is an 
unacceptable option. Business leaders will explain that 
it will cost jobs and growth when integrated supply 
chains become impossible. Even the possibility of no 
trade deal will have a significant impact, leading to 
sharp and painful reductions in business investment, 
trade and, ultimately, growth and jobs. And there will 
be little evidence to suggest that the alleged benefits 
from Brexit, especially concerning international 
trade, are likely to materialise. Consequently, the 
supporters of a soft Brexit on both sides of the political 
spectrum will continue to threaten the majority of the 
Conservative government.
The Northern Ireland issue remains unresolved as 
well, with the backstop looming if the UK cannot find 
a highly integrated customs and regulatory solution 
that would ensure a frictionless border (such as 
being inside the SM and CU). With no trade deal, a 
frictionless border becomes impossible, implying a 
customs border between mainland UK and Northern 
Ireland after the transition. Such an outcome is 
unacceptable for the DUP that provides the votes to 
maintain Mrs May’s majority.
A changing wind?
There remains only one possible solution: staying 
in the SM and the CU, i.e. putting a “Norway+”3 
arrangement back on the negotiation table. It offers 
minimal economic disruption after the transition and 
ensures that the NI border remains frictionless.
It would require, however, a fundamental change in the 
UK political debate since it would virtually break every 
red line of the Brexiteers, from accepting Freedom of 
Movement of people to relinquishing the possibility of 
an independent commercial policy. In essence, it would 
imply becoming a rule-taker. Even if it were dressed up 
as a ‘special and unique’ arrangement, it would demand 
a momentous change in British politics.
For the moment, many voices across the political 
spectrum argue strongly against this outcome. 
Brexiteers claim that this does not represent a real 
Brexit. Corbyn and others in the Labour Party fear that 
such a deal would constrain the UK in its domestic 
policies. But there are already signs that positions are 
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3 Here defined as an economic deal that ensures the UK remains 
effectively in the Single Market and the Customs Union.
starting to shift towards a softer Brexit in light of the 
threatening prospect of a ‘no trade deal’ cliff edge.
A cross-party alliance supported by 
business and trade unions could argue 
that, given that Brexit has happened, 
a soft landing in the form of Norway+ 
is the best possible option to minimise 
economic costs.
In March 2019, Brexit will have become a reality. The 
British government will have delivered on the result of 
the referendum. After Brexit, there could be a general 
inclination to maintain the status quo and put an end 
to the upending of the UK’s economy. A cross-party 
alliance supported by business and trade unions could 
argue that, given that Brexit has happened, a soft 
landing in the form of Norway+ is the best possible 
option to minimise economic costs.
This shift in the political wind could be triggered 
when the need for an extension of the transition 
period becomes apparent. If the UK has to ask for an 
extension, it will highlight that the trade negotiations 
are not advancing as fast as they should. The cliff 
edge would, once again, put pressure on the social 
and economic expectations of businesses and workers 
alike. Controversially, any extension of the transition 
would commit the UK to contribute more to the EU 
budget, demonstrating that the costs of maintaining 
economic integration are much less significant than 
those implied by no deal or a hard Brexit. At that point, 
the most compelling argument could be to preserve the 
status quo for the long term.
Be prepared
Even if the wind changes, concluding a Norway+ 
deal will not be easy. Some of the barriers noted 
above, however, will become less difficult: an existing 
institutional and legal framework would merely have 
to be adapted. But doing so would still take time. 
That’s why preparations for such a scenario must start 
now. Neither the European Commission nor the UK 
Government can start the drafting of such a solution 
until it is officially back on the table. Civil society, 
business and think tanks must take the lead. Since it 
is the only feasible path to avoid the prospect of not 
having a trade arrangement at the end of the transition 
period, it is worth investing now to minimise economic 
disruptions for both the UK and the EU27.
Will this be a long-term solution? Probably not. It is 
hard to believe the UK would remain as a permanent 
rule-taker, even if it will wield its soft power effectively. 
But the Norway+ option offers a solution if the UK 
becomes dissatisfied with its status: the application for 
full membership of the European Union. Maybe, in the 
long run, membership of the EEA might provide a soft 
interlude for the UK to regain membership in future. 
Currently, the Norway+ option remains the sole scenario 
that could stop the Brexit process from becoming ever 
more destructive and painful for all concerned.
Fabian Zuleeg is Chief Executive and Chief Economist at 
the European Policy Centre. This Policy Brief builds on 
discussions held in the context of the EPC’s Brexit Forum, 
which is kindly supported by the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 
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The BrexitForum@EPC looks at the implications and 
potential consequences for those who will find themselves 
outside the Single Market but seek ways to influence its 
direction in the future as well. EPC analysts and other 
experts are providing insights and expertise with a view 
to helping them prepare for the post-Brexit era. Findings 
from discussions and related publications will provide 
participants with a better understanding of the UK’s 
future relationship with the EU.
EUROPEAN POLICY CENTRE   |   14-16 RUE DU TRÔNE/TROONSTRAAT   |   B-1000 BRUSSELS   |   BELGIUM    |   WWW.EPC.EU
